This study proposes an information asymmetry hypothesis to examine why bank credit ratings vary among countries even when bank financial ratios remain constant. 
Introduction
The study of how credit ratings are determined has attracted considerable attention recently. Early investigations of this area typically used financial ratios to explain and predict ratings and their changes. 1 Recent works have identified two plausible "credit rating inconsistencies". First, the same firm sometimes receives different ratings when rated by different rating agencies (Ederington 1985; Beattie and Searle 1992; Moon and Stotsky 1993; Cantor and Packer 1994). This is considered an inconsistency because given full information disclosure the same firm should receive roughly equivalent ratings regardless of rating agency. 2 This study attempts to identify the causes of the second inconsistency. As The second inconsistency is that rating agencies issue different ratings for firms that have the same financial ratios but are located in different countries. That is, two firms with identical financial performance will not necessarily receive identical ratings. 2 This paper proposes an information asymmetry hypothesis to investigate why ratings differ among banks with similar financial ratios in different countries. We posit that when a bank is located in an industrialized country, or in a country with strong institutional environment quality, the financial ratios are more likely to reflect bank intrinsic value. Accordingly, little asymmetric information exists between rating agencies and banks in these countries. In contrast, these asymmetric information problems are more acute in developing economies and countries with weak institutional environment quality, making banks' financial ratios more susceptible than those in developed countries (Vives 2006) . The poor financial quality of such banks leads rating agencies to doubt the credibility of financial statements and thus issue lower ratings despite identical financial ratios. Accordingly, different ratings may be issued to two banks with similar financial ratios where one is located in a country with low information asymmetry while the other is in a country with high information asymmetry.
The study makes three main contributions to the literature. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review.
Section 3 out lines and discusses the methodology. Section 4 de scribes data sources and descriptive statistical analysis. The results are reported in Section 5 and section 6
is the robust testing. Section 7 summarizes the conclusions.
Literature Review

Credit rating determinants
External credit ratings can be regarded as comprehensive measures of risk, because they incorporate all of the risk factors that are perceived to be relevant by rating agencies. Early investigations of this area typically used financial ratios to explain and predict ratings and their changes. For example, the model of Horrigan (1966), incorporating six financial variables, 3 Recently, Blume et al. (1998) found that accounting ratios and market risk data were stronger determinants of larger corporations' ratings. Similarly, Estrella et al.
(2000) examined the predictive power of capital ratios on US bank failures and found a strong connection between capital ratios and external debt ratings, such that balance sheet and size data could replicate a major part of the debt ratings from S&P. found that rating agencies weight the same financial variables differently when assigning ratings to Japanese and non-Japanese issuers. The results indicated that S&P may assign profitability a higher degree of importance and a lower level of significance to short-term debt to total debt when determining the ratings of Japanese issuers.
Some literatures indicated that country-specific variables affect credit rating determinants but they did not show how they affect credit ratings. 
Effects of information asymmetry
Previous studies separately analyzed samples from developed and less developed countries, and examined whether financial ratios can explain and predict credit ratings.
For example, Ferri et al. (2001) found that the rating criteria used for firms in less-developed countries differ from those used for firms in developed countries. They also found that correlation between the changes in firm and sovereign ratings is almost non-existent for G-10 countries, but increases with decreasing national income level. Finally, they found that in less developed countries the probability of issuer rating being downgraded increases when sovereign rating is downgraded. 
Econometric Model
To conduct the econometric analysis, this study converts the long-term alphanumeric ratings issued by S&P into 17 numerical ratings, 
To test the relations between financial ratios and credit ratings, this study uses the ordered probit model because the 17 categories of credit ratings indicate ordinal risk assessments. Furthermore, this study assumes The five financial ratios employed in this study take the form of averages over the past three years so as to minimize the business cycle effect 5 For the sake of easily elucidated our testing results, we classify the financial ratios into two groups according to their impacts direction on the ratings. Ratios with higher values reflecting respective better and worse financial strengths are referred to as the "positive" and "negative" financial ratios. The former include Profitability, Liquidity and Capital while the latter include Efficiency and Quality. The information asymmetry hypothesis presented in this study thus proposes in countries with low information asymmetry the positive influence of positive financial ratios is enhanced, as is the negative influence of negative financial ratios, while in countries with high information asymmetry, the influences of both positive and negative financial ratios are reduced.
. Profitability denotes the average ratio of net income to total assets over the past three years, Liquidity denotes the average ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, Capital represents the capital adequacy ratio, as defined by the Bank of International Settlement, Efficiency denotes the average ratio of cost to income, and Quality is the average ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenues.
Lnasset and SCR are employed as control variables, where Lnasset is defined as the natural logarithm of the total assets and SCR denotes the S&P's sovereign credit rating. SCRs are similarly transformed from letter ratings into 17 numerical ratings.
Borensztein et al. (2006) found the "sovereign ceiling effect" to be statistically highly significant, especially, in the banking industry. The year dummies and country dummies are also included to control for the effects of time and country variations. A dummy variable for each country is constructed such that it is unity for that country's observation and zero otherwise.
9 Equation (2) further assumes that the coefficients (weights) of financial ratios
are influenced by Z, which includes two vectors for the proxies of asymmetric information.
Z= (INCOME, INSTITUTION)
The first set proxy, INCOME, is the vector of country development level. This study thus divides the sample countries into high-income countries (HIC) and institutional environment quality values are referred to as "low information asymmetry countries", while countries in the MIC and EMERGING group, or those with low institutional environment values are classified as "high information asymmetry countries". The information asymmetry hypothesis presented in this study indicates that, in countries with low information asymmetry, the influences of financial ratios are strengthened, whereas they are mitigated in countries with serious asymmetry. Regarding coefficients, in the case of countries with low information asymmetry, the coefficients of their interaction terms with positive and negative financial ratios are positive and negative, respectively. In contrast, for countries with serious information asymmetry, the coefficients of their interaction terms with positive and negative financial ratios are reversed, i.e., they are negative and positive, respectively. Table 2 lists the data definitions and sources. Table 3 Table 7 lists the estimated results of equations (1) and (2) . When only equation (1) is considered (the first column), the coefficients on t he positive financial ratios, Profitability, Liquidity and Capital display the expected positive signs, whereas the coefficients of negative financial ratios, Efficiency and Quality, exhibit the expected negative signs. Additionally, all coefficients are significant. Thus, a bank with higher positive financial ratio or lower negative financial ratio tends to receive higher ratings.
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistical analysis
Empirical Results
The next four columns present the results using HIC, INDUSTRY, MIC and EMERGING as the measure of information asymmetry. When HIC is used, the coefficients of its interaction terms with five financial ratios overwhelmingly show the expected signs, i.e., they are positive and negative for the positive and negative financial ratios, respectively. Additionally, all coefficients on the interaction terms are significant except for the Capital. Accordingly, this study hypothesis is fully 0.001). This zero net effect is again consistent with our hypothesis that less transparent financial ratio in middle-income countries will reduce the weights of the financial ratios. Consequently, rating agencies assessing the banks in these regions cannot do so by using financial ratios.
When using EMERGING as the proxy, the estimated results are largely consistent with our hypothesis. For example, while the coefficient of Profitability is significantly positive (0.179), its interaction term with EMERGING is significantly negative (-0.162), reducing the net effect of Profitability on rating in emerging market economies. Significantly negative coefficient of EMERGING×Liquidity and significantly positive coefficient of EMERGING×Quality are also observed, respectively, reducing the influence of financial ratios. This study hypothesis thus is supported for these two regions.
Notably, the above coefficients of interaction term between Capital and various proxies of information asymmetry (HIC/INDUSTRY/MIC/EMERGING) are insignificant in this study. Moreover, this situation is found to be the norm rather than an exception. That is, Capital appears insensitive to degree of information asymmetry, 15 making the coefficients of its interaction terms insignificant. We provide one plausible conjecture as follows. In both low and high information asymmetry regimes, raters consider Capital to be paramount to banks in guarding against default and ignoring its influence would send the incorrect signal that it is unimportant. Thus, despite values of Capital being opaque and substantially underestimated in serious information asymmetry regimes, raters have no alternative but to adopt a second best policy that still assigns higher ratings to banks with higher capital. The weight of Capital thus is insensitive to the income level of countries here. Table 8 
Throughout all reported tables, the control variables of both Lnasset and SCR
show the expected positive influences on r atings. Thus, larger bank asset sizes and 16 higher sovereign credit ratings boost bank credit ratings. Additionally, in most cases, the sovereign credit rating is typically the ceiling for bank credit ratings.
Robust Testing
Effect of accounting standards
Because different accounting standards, GAAP and IFRS, may affect the ratings in a different way, we examine the robustness of our results by taking them into account. cost of capital estimates and did not find significant differences across local GAAP and IFRS firms in the EU.
Robust testing of capital role by omitting CCC rated banks
Throughout this paper, CCC rated banks are found to exhibit eccentric behavior, for example their Capitals are inclined to be the second highest, marginally next to the AAA rated banks. The similar condition holds for Liquidity. This work thus hypothesizes that CCC rated banks are aware of their fragile financial condition, or are frequently warned by the regulators of this problem. Therefore, such banks thus try to ask help for financial objections from the market or the government, improving the ratios of Capital and Liquidity.
The previous tables show that Capital frequently become insignificant for interaction terms with asymmetric information variables, leading us to argue that
Capital is insensitive to asymmetric information environments. Two arguments are raised here. First, Capital plays the same role as other financial ratios and it is the existence of CCC rated banks that lead to insensitive coefficients. If this is the case, removing CCC rated banks would recover the significance of coefficients of interaction terms with Capital. Also, we could argue that the observed inconsistencies in the behavior of Capital result from the existence of CCC rated banks. Alternatively, if eccentric results still exist for Capital even we remove the CCC rated banks, then in raters' mind, Capital is indeed different from the other financial ratios. Finally, raters treat Capital considerably differently from other financial ratios.
Raters assign heavy weight on Capital even in a country with severe information asymmetry. We speculate that this is because rating agencies consider capital to be the most important factor for banks in guarding against default. Also, the global institution, such as International Monetary Fund also considers capital to be the most important factor in building up the financial soundness indicator. Ignoring capital in countries with serious information asymmetry would send the incorrect signal that capital is unimportant. Accordingly, even if the quality of capital is opaque or substantially underestimated in these countries, rating agencies cannot help but assign better ratings to banks with greater capital. Two set variables are included to examine whether asymmetric information can affect the relationship between financial ratios and credit ratings. The first set is the development level of a country, including HIC, MIC, INDUSTRY and EMERGING. HIC is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the country stems from high-income countries and 0 otherwise. MIC is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the country stems from middle-income countries. INDUSTRY is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in an industrial country and 0 otherwise. EMERGING is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in emerging market economies and 0 otherwise. The second set is the institutional environment quality of a country, including LAWORDER, BUREAU, INTEGRITY and DISCLOSE. LAWORDER is a country's law and order index, ranging from1 to 6, the higher score representing the better a country's law and order. BUREAU is an index of a country's quality of bureaucracy, ranging from 1 to 4, with higher scores representing more efficient of the bureaucracy. INTEGRITY is an index of corruption, ranging from 1 to 6, with higher scores for lower levels of corruption. DISCLOSE is a country's information quality, on a scale of 0 to10, with higher scores for higher information quality 31 Notes:
1. The sample year is from 2002 to 2008 across 86 countries. The financial ratios employed here are the average of the past three years to minimize the business cycle effect. The term Profitability is the average ratio of net income to total assets, Liquidity stands for the average ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding, Capital is the average ratio of required capital to risky assets. Efficiency denotes the average ratio of cost to income, and Quality is the average ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest revenues. Lnasset is defined as the average ratio of natural logarithm of total assets. 2. In Panel B, we present sovereign credit ratings across different bank credit ratings. The sovereign credit ratings are categorized into AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC. 3. In Panel C, the set is the development level of a country, including HIC, MIC, INDUSTRY and EMERGING. HIC is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the country stems from high-income countries and 0 otherwise. MIC is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the country stems from middle-income countries. INDUSTRY is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in an industrial country and 0 otherwise. EMERGING is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in emerging market economies and 0 otherwise. 4. In Panel D, the set is the institutional environment quality of a country, including LAWORDER, BUREAU, INTEGRITY and DISCLOSE. LAWORDER is a country's law and order index, ranging from1 to 6, the higher score representing the better a country's law and order. BUREAU is an index of a country's quality of bureaucracy, ranging from 1 to 4, with higher scores representing more efficient of the bureaucracy. INTEGRITY is an index of corruption, ranging from 1 to 6, with higher scores for lower levels of corruption. DISCLOSE is a country's information quality, on a scale of 0 to10, with higher scores for higher information quality. INDUSTRY is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in an industrial country and 0 otherwise. EMERGING is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if the bank is located in emerging market economies and 0 otherwise. INSQUA is the average ratio of LAWORDER, BUREAU and INTEGRITY to proxy the whole institutional environment quality of a country. DISCLOSE is a country's information quality, on a scale of 0 t o10, with higher scores for higher information quality.
